戰略研究之挑戰與回應 戰略研究之挑戰與回應 The Challenges and Responses of Strategic Studies (載於《國防政策評論》,第四卷第三期,民國93年春,台北,頁14-30。) 鄭大誠 Ta-chen Cheng 序言 Introduction 不可諱言地,「戰略」一詞對於許多人來說是個頗難掌握的概念。追本溯源,西方「戰略」(strategy)這個字緣自古希臘字源,原指「將軍」或「將道」之意,在理解上也可以從這個角度去著手。不過由於一般人過於濫用「戰略」以及其相關概念,致使「戰略」一詞在意涵上變得語焉不詳,甚至於還常有誤用的情況發生。因此,在討論「戰略」及「戰略研究」之挑戰前,的確有必要需將相關概念釐清,以正題旨。 Strategy, stemming from an ancient Greek term for a general and generalship, has never been an easy subject to be mastered. Admittedly, people often get confused with the meaning of strategy and its derived notions due to their ambiguous nature. It would be useful to clarify the meaning of strategy before going further to discuss its nature. 何謂「戰略」呢?約米尼(Baron de Jomini)指出,「戰略」就是一種在戰場重要地點或作戰區內指揮大部份軍隊之藝術。[1] 與其約同一時期的克勞塞維茨(Carl von Clausewitz)則說,「戰略」是為達成戰爭目的而對於武力之使用。英國的李德哈特(Liddell-Hart)認為,「戰略」是分配及運用軍事手段以達成政策目的之藝術。法國薄富爾將軍(Andre Beaufre)則將「戰略」定義為武力辯證關係的藝術或是兩種欲使用武力解決紛爭之對立意志間的辯證藝術。[2]綜上看來,雖然戰略研究先驅們對於「戰略」之定義反映出某種概念上之複雜性,不過卻也可以看出其一貫精神,那就是「戰略」扮演了「政策」與「武力」(military force)的中間聯繫。[3]直至今日,雖然「戰略」在應用上會隨著時代變遷而有所流變,細部內涵或許已不能再以傳統框架來審視,但基本這種由確定之政治目標自宏觀、全局的層面來對於軍事行動進行指導的關係依然不變。 For a reasonable clarification, Baron de Jomini defined strategy as “the art of directing the greater part of the forces of an army on to the most important point of a theatre of war, or of a zone of operations.” His contemporary, Carl von Clausewitz called strategy “the use of engagement for the object of war”. Captain Liddell-Hart asserted “strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the end of policy”, and General Andre Beaufre said that “strategy is the art of the dialectic of force or the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.” Different definitions by predecessors of strategic studies, though reflecting somewhat abstract elements of strategy, have manifested the fact that the mission of strategy is to relate military power to political purpose. Despite the facts that details of strategy will dynamically change over time and we can no longer oversee strategy simply using the old-fashioned framework, it still would not encounter too many challenges, even by today’s standard, if we take strategy as essentially the product of dialogue between policy and military force. 「戰略」之基本精神至今雖然未有重大變化,不過專門研究「戰略」之「戰略研究」(strategic studies)學科內容卻較孫子或是克勞塞維茨時代不知擴大了多少。今日的「戰略研究」雖然仍以戰爭研究為主要重點之一,不過也涵括了「安全」、「國防」以及「軍事科學」等種種議題。也因為今日的「戰略」必須以許多不同的專業知識做為計劃、分析或研究之基礎,「戰略研究」也因此必然面臨來自其涵括課題中所可能遇到的種種困難及挑戰。在下面的章節中,作者遂將重新審視「戰略研究」所面臨來自內部與外部的可能挑戰,同時並提出相關論述說明此類困難均 房地產不足影響其未來的蓬勃發展。 At present, strategy and its academic investigation, strategic studies have been developed into a subject matter that was too broad to be expected by Clausewitz or Sun Tzu. Strategic studies is still chiefly dealing with the object and conduct of war, but it has been as much concerned as with other issues like security, defence, military science, etc. As known, to make a good strategy in a modern context needs professional knowledge from various sources. As an intellectual inquisition, however, strategy would unavoidably face difficulties out of its nature, components and approaches. In the following pages, I will examine those challenges, internally and externally, which make strategy difficult, and try to prove that such difficulties cannot thwart the ongoing progress of strategic studies. 多元特性 Multidisciplinary nature  在其名著《戰爭論》當中,克勞塞維茨指出「戰略」本身包含了道德、物力、數學、地理以及統計等多重特性。[4]已故英國著名的戰略學者霍華德(Michael Howard)也在其研究中提出了「戰略」應包括社會、後勤、作戰以及科技等面相。[5]如前所述,今日的「戰略研究」業已發展成人類社會中最具多元特性的學科之一。所謂的「戰略研究者」可能來自極為不同之知識領域,包括政治學、史學、地理學、社會學、心理學、哲學、統計學、法學、倫理學、管理學、工程學、物理學、化學、後勤學等等。此種多元現象不僅反映出「戰略研究」內涵及研究方法之爭鳴局面,也隱含著理解、評估以及制定今日「戰略」需要各學科間之群力合作,且不藉此不能為功。 In his work On War, Clausewitz pointed out that strategy is consisted of moral, physical, mathematical, geographic and statistical elements. Michael Howard also referred to the social, logistical, operational, and technological dimensions of strategy. Today, strategy and strategic studies have been cultivated into one of the most multidisciplinary subject matters in human society. Those so-called strategists might come from entirely distinct academic fields, including political science, history, geography, sociology, psychology, philosophy, statistics, law, ethics, management, engineering, physics, chemistry, logistics etc. Such phenomenon not only reflects the extensive contents and approaches of strategic studies, but also means that to apprehend, evaluate and formulate strategy requires collective efforts from various research fields. 不可避免地,此種來自各學科,從哲學到科學、從理論到運用之多元要求,也造成了「戰略研究」本質之複雜性。平心而論,「戰略研究」並沒有所謂之學科分野與邊界存在,人類生活的各種智識都可能成為其一部份;學界也沒有一本書敢聲稱其內容業已包括「戰略研究」之所有可能範圍。此種多元而複雜特質也直接或間接地造成了「戰略研究」必然會概括承受了各子學科在研究上所可能遭遇到的各種困難及挑戰,致使「戰略研究」在立場、觀點以及研究方法上均較諸其他學科更為分歧及莫衷一是。 Unavoidably, these demanding intellectual requirements, from philosophy to sciences, from basic research to applied research, make it difficult to produce a comprehensive picture of strategy. There was no acknowledged academic boundary of strategic studies, and no single work can be confident in having covered all matters in contemporary strategy to a satisfactory degree. Potential controversies or debates, including research premises, methods and designs of each relevant field will be found in strategic studies. Various approaches and other disagreeme 宜蘭民宿nts, possibly far more divisive than other disciplines, make reaching consensus, if possible, distinctively difficult among the strategic circles. 戰略之機密性 Secrecy as a veil 許多從事「戰略研究」的研究者在欲從事「戰略」相關問題之探討時,常常會發現自己身陷在機密等級劃分制度所產生的帷幕之中而難以發揮。在保護「國家安全」或「國家利益」的名號之下,許多關鍵或是重要的研究資料常以「機密」為由而被政府禁止流通或參閱。無疑地,研究資料的缺乏也造成了「戰略研究」在研究上的困難性。 Those who are undertaking strategy-related research may easily find themselves entrapped in clouds of forbiddance by classification systems while approaching interested topics. Under the name for protecting national security or interests, many useful or essential materials have been heavily shrouded in secrecy. Without doubt, the restriction on classified materials critically leads to the research obstacle for strategic studies. 一般來說,機密制度對於「戰略研究」所造成的困難大概可以分為三個層面:首先是政府內有關戰略議題,包括國防、軍事及安全政策決策的限制。眾所周知,所謂的「國家戰略」雖然多是行政單位的既定政策,不過其制定往往僅建立在極少數決策階層之討論及同意下。根據保密制度規定,政府內其他「無必要得知」之人士則不需知悉或參與,冷戰時期各核武強權關於核子戰略決策之重重限制就是最好的例子。為了保護「國家安全」,除了行政單位內的保密限制外,其他有權與聞國防與戰略之機關,如國會或立法單位的代表或在野黨成員也往往只能獲悉片面、簡化甚至是扭曲、錯誤之戰略訊息。如果政府高層不願解密,許多關心戰略的政治人物就可能如同一般市井小民一般,對重大戰略訊息一無所知。在「保密」的大蠹下,較諸其他的公共政策,「戰略」議題顯然難以在政府機關間在資訊相對充足的前提下盡情辯論,更遑論政策之制衡功能可以在朝野資訊平等的情況下有所發揮。 Problems of secrecy as a veil over strategy include several levels. First is about the restricted participation of decision-making within the government. As known, the so-called national strategy is the fait accompli of the government, but is often established on the need-to-know basis. It is also not unusual that even in parliament, congress or other legislative body which has the power to review defence or security policy and budget of the state, members of parliament, congressmen or legislators are often told a simplified, if not erroneous story on strategic planning by government officials. Unlike other public issues, which can be fully discussed and debated, the creation of strategy may simply be the product of few politicians, and subject to personal or party influences. Unless the governments, especially those of closed countries, are willing to release classified materials, most officials and politicians may never know the truth of strategy as other ordinary people. 其次,對於政府外的「戰略研究」界而言,渠等因為研究資料之處處受限而產生的抱怨亦非少聞。常常為人所垢病的是,在機密制度的限制下,一般研究者所能接觸到的機密資料(如果有管道的話),不是有所粉飾就是難以盡窺全豹,嚴重影響到「戰略研究」的品質。不僅研究者對於研究課題之興趣無法滿足,同時學界也難以提供有關「戰略」之良好參考或建議,阻礙了「戰略研究」的良性發展。 Second, as for non-governmental researchers, their complaints of having very scarce accesses to strategic materials have not seldom been heard. By the name of national security, research objects are in many cases covered with a modified veil which not only leads to 關鍵字行銷 obstacles for research or analysis but also causes misunderstanding of specific, if not all cognitional establishment. Such purpose-made cloak determines that real strategy would not likely be reflected. 第三個層次則泛指一般社會大眾,在機密的外衣下,原本就對於「戰略」缺乏興趣或專業知識的民眾更加不願因為觸碰機密而賈禍上身,致使其對於「戰略研究」在此種「多一事不如少一事」的成見下愈感冷漠。 在此種「戰略冷感症」不斷惡化之下,「戰略研究」很容易被縮限為「菁英科學」,其結果不僅國家戰略的擬訂、評估及其相關研究都不能獲得大多數民眾的關心,戰略議題也不能得到廣泛的重視。所謂「戰略」僅將成為政治人物口中虛幻不實的概念,對於一般民眾毫無具體意義,這也是戰略研究者最不願見到的狀況。 The third level is about the general public. Thanks to the classification systems, most of the general public, who might largely lack interests, knowledge or both in strategy and do not want to get into troubles by touching forbidden matters, would have become more and more indifferent to strategic issues. In the end, the formulation, evaluation, and relevant study on strategy may increasingly become an “elite science” cared by only a small group of people. Strategy would simply be an abstract term toyed by politicians without substantial implications. 戰爭之霧 Fog of war 克勞塞維茨認為,戰爭是一個充滿機會、不定以及不安之領域,無法用數學般的制式原理來掌握其發展。有鑒於此,他特別提出了「戰爭之霧」與「衝突」之概念,藉此具體描述真實戰爭中難以理性計算之部份。在本質上,「戰爭之霧」與「衝突」是區別實戰與紙上談兵之主要因素,個人除非實際參與戰爭,否則無法具體體驗此種不確定性。[6]由於真實戰爭的此種特性,詳加擬訂之「戰略」無法盡如其意,甚至於還可能導致失敗的命運。[7]對克勞塞維茨來說,無論何時何地,任何「戰略」都是沒有附加保證書的。 For Clausewitz, war was a realm of chance, of uncertainty, of behavior in a resistant medium. Accordingly, he developed ideas of “the fog of war” and “friction”, which are the very concepts that distinguish real war from war on paper, to describe the effect of reality in war. The complexities in war accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. Due to such uncertainty of war, well-developed strategy may lose battles, or lead to unexpected results. There is no warranty for strategy at all times. 直至今日,克勞塞維茨所說的「戰爭之霧」與「衝突」概念仍有效地說明了「戰略」中的不確定因素,此也仍然是「戰略研究」中所最難以評估的部份。[8]軍事科技的進步,如精準武器的不斷提昇與改良等,雖然對於驅散部份「戰爭之霧」有所助益,但另一方面卻也新製造出了其他的不確定因素。舉例而言,無人能夠預料在一支高度依賴精密裝備的軍隊當中,機件故障會對戰事造成多大的損失與傷害。同時,今日戰爭也還是活生生對立意志的鬥爭,科技的進步仍不能解決人為的誤失以及預料到政治上的未知發展。自過往歷史可知,強大若美國,卻不能有效以其優勢軍力屈服擅長游擊戰之越共。反而身陷越南泥沼,最後才灰頭土臉地退出赤化的越南。此種結果乃是當初決定介入越南的美國官員所始料未及的;一九九八年科索沃戰爭當中,北約以強勢空中轟炸卻未能達到預期屈服塞爾維亞的效果,反而還誤炸了中共大使館,把局勢弄得更加複雜。連聯軍指揮官克拉克將軍後來都承認,所有的戰爭與作戰原則都無法在科索沃戰爭中運用。[9]換言之,「戰爭之霧」與「衝突」等不確定因素依然在今日與明日戰場上盤繞不去,對於戰略研究者而言都還是難以解決的挑戰。[10] Until today, Clausewitz’s “fog of war” still has been remaining as an unpredictable 關鍵字行銷 factor in strategy. The progress of military technology, such as the improvement of precision weapons helps to disperse some fog of war, but it also produces new uncertainties and problems. No one, for example, could predict how seriously unexpected mechanic failure would create in an army which highly depends on modern equipments. Technology also cannot solve the problems of human errors. In retrospect, the US, as a super power, could not simply defeat Vietcong by employing its military superiority during a long time bloody struggle. Hardly could the Americans get out of the Vietnam quagmire and ironically such embarrassment was not initially, if not never, expected by those confident and arrogant decision-makers comfortably sitting in the situation room in Washington. Similarly, in 1998, people would remember that Serbia did not succumb to NATO’s continuous strategic bombardment. From bad to worse, alliance’s mistake to destroy the Chinese embassy further complicated the whole situation. Even the operation Commander-in-Chief General Wesley Clark later admitted that no rules of combat and operation could be applied in Kosovo. Friction, fog, ambiguity, chance and uncertainty may still linger on present and future battlefields as they did in the past, and make strategists continuously perplexed. 戰略研究圈的內部紛爭 Internal disagreement among the strategic circles 很不幸地,即使在面臨以上挑戰及困難的情況下,戰略研究圈的內部關係卻並非和諧團結,甚至對於戰略議題如何計劃、闡述、評估與分析均常常存有極為不同的看法,因而更加深了「戰略研究」的內在困難。此種分歧主要反映在兩類紛爭上:第一類是文人與軍職戰略研究者間之不和,另一類則是惟心論及惟物論者間之矛盾。此兩類紛爭不僅無助於「戰略」之建設性發展,更使得「戰略研究」中所謂「共識」或「一般看法」難以產生。 It is somehow embarrassing to admit that even with so many imbroglios; hardly do relations among the strategic circles appear harmonious. How to plan, interpret, and evaluate strategy does often incur serious contentions, which are particularly exacerbated by two cleavages: the struggle between civilian strategists and uniformed analysts, and the quarrels between strategism and technism. Internal disagreements make strategic consensus, if necessary, much more unaccommodating to acquire. 大致來說,文人戰略研究者包括兩個族群:一個是屬於與政府直接或間接相關機構或部門,不論是經由契約(如智庫)或是聘任(如國防部編制內研究員)關係,為政府或軍隊提供戰略相關議題分析、研究、評估甚至制定的文職人員。第二類則是來自政府外之學界,包括許多大學或非政府資助的研究機構中對於「戰略研究」有濃厚興趣且從事相關研究的人員,學術訓練、邏輯思考以及科學研究方法為其研究之特質。[11]文人戰略研究者在美國特別興盛,不僅蔚為風潮,甚至業已發展出相當之規模。許多戰略思維均是出於如蘭德公司(RAND)等智庫或大學戰略研究中心之手,其蓬勃局面他國實難以望其項背。軍職戰略研究者則指的是在政府或軍中從是戰略規劃、研究、分析甚至制定的軍職人員。由於渠等之職業軍人身份,使其在戰略研究與分析上多了許多實務經驗與了解,此種經驗與知識也使得軍職戰略研究者對於各戰略議題能夠提出較符合實際且可行性較高之建議與看法。 In general, civilian strategists consist of two groups. The first includes those working for the government on strategy-related matters either by contract or through recruitment. The second group comprises university or non-governmental research institute based academics, who are interested in and e 買屋ngaging in strategic studies. Civilian strategists are particularly prosperous in the US, and have developed into an unparalleled profession. No one will forget that many of the most authoritative works on Cold War nuclear strategy were written under government contracts by private think tanks such as RAND Cooperation. Generally speaking, academic training, logic reasoning and scientific research are the features of the works of civilian strategists. By contrast, uniformed analysts are career servicemen who are doing strategic planning, analysis or other forms of research within the military or the government. Their devotion to the military permits them more opportunities to be familiar with the activities of armed forces. Such knowledge and experiences also allow them to produce more reasonable and practical strategic planning and assessment. 雖然文人與軍職研究者均對「戰略研究」提供了不同但皆重要之貢獻,但不可否認地,兩方在研究上卻也承受了不同的侷限,彼此對於對方的研究成果也有著不同評價。文人研究者常由於較為缺乏軍旅經驗以及對於軍中實務了解之不足因而常被職業軍人所看輕,前者之研究成果亦常被批評為過於「學院派」甚或是不切實際,無法切合國家實際之戰略需要。不過,文人對於軍職研究者的指責亦非少見。由於軍人身份的限制,軍職研究者往往不能將其研究成果對外發表,減少了許多與外界交流、溝通的機會。即使軍職研究者能對外公開研究成果,其立場也不能牴觸政府與軍中的既定立場與政策,[12]因而其意見常會被批評為過度保守。此外,軍職研究者還常被批評為本位主義:渠等僅顧本身軍種或單位之利益,以各種理論來證成其爭奪更大部份預算的企圖,對於政府其他部門的公共支出並不關心,因而無法提供較為全面而兼顧國家整體財政健全的戰略建議與方針。 Works of civilian strategists and uniformed analysts, however both have their own limitations. It is not uncommon to find that the proposals of civilian strategists are belittled out of their deficiencies of military experiences or of accesses to information by uniformed analysts. Critiques on the latter are no less severe than that of their civilian counterparts. Unlike external strategists, uniformed analysts are not at liberty to publish or speak as they choose. Besides, as a part of the military, official service and military positions are always needed to be taken care of by uniformed strategists. Understandably, they are often impugned as being too military or service-biased to have a “balanced and comprehensive” view of strategy. Other public affairs, especially financial issues are blindly ignored. 「戰略研究」界中「惟心論」與「惟物論」兩派的歧異主要來自對於科技發展在現代軍事戰場貢獻的不同看法。[13]相較於其他「戰略研究」學派,「惟心論」對於政治人物與軍事領導人的藝術與技巧給予無比之重視。渠等認為「戰略」僅乃是政治之產物,「戰略研究」除了奠基於此外並無他途,並不關心武器裝備的發展。[14]相較之下,「惟物論」則對於「戰略」之物質面,亦即武器裝備給予最高之重視。「惟物論」的支持者認為,見諸歷史,武備的革命性發展往往是在其戰略指導發展之前。所謂「戰略」不過是為配合武器發展所提出之後見之明,武器發展才是「戰略」發展及「戰術」制定之原動力,自然也應該是「戰略研究」的重心。 Disagreement between strategism and technism is basically out of their deviated cognitions on technology, which has been playing a more and more important role in modern strategy. Distinguished from other schools of strategic thoughts, strategism attaches an exclusive importance to the skill of the statesmen and the generals with the ignorance of the military instrument which does 烤肉 the fighting. Technism by contrast expresses a strong preference on material aspects of strategy, namely weapons and equipments for the modern war. Its proponents observe that in history, the development of technology has been far more progressive than that of strategy, and believe that technology per se is the driving force or motivation for strategy. As such, technology, rather than abstract theories, should become the core to which doctrines and tactics primarily are molded. 研究方法上的挑戰 Methodological challenges 無可諱言地,即使大多數人承認「戰略」有其研究之必要性,卻仍然有許多批評者認為現存的「戰略研究」缺乏所謂學術性,也絕稱不上是一門「科學」。舉例來說,葛林(Philip Green)就曾攻擊「戰略研究」乃是一種「假科學」,研究者不過使用一些看似科學的方式來給予其研究標的不實的證成。[15]諸如此類的批評不僅著眼於「戰略研究」的多元內涵,同時還特別質疑「戰略研究」研究方法的科學性。有鑒於此,如何能夠對於此類攻訐給予有力反駁,自然也成為戰略研究者捍衛其學科的主要工作之一。 On several occasions, strategy and strategic studies have been accused as being “not scholarly” enough in the first place by some commentators. Philip Green, for example, had ever tarnished strategic studies “pseudo-scientific”, using apparent scientific methods to give it a spurious air of legitimacy. Judgements like these are focusing not only on the miscellaneous feature of strategy, but also on its methods as a scientific investigation. How to find counterattacks to these propositions becomes a major task for strategists to uphold their discipline. 對於「戰略研究」在研究方法上的攻擊主要著眼在下列幾個層面。首先,批評者認為根據一般的科學研究標準,為了驗證某「戰略」之有效或適合與否,足夠的驗證結果是有所必要的。然而,吾人顯然不可能為了驗證某「戰略」之有效性而發動戰爭。證明結果之缺乏只說明了「戰略」不過是方法論上有所缺憾的「理論」,其實用性則難以證明。這種否定「戰略」有效性的評論在冷戰時期尤為強勢而特別難以辯駁。由於核子戰爭的恐怖性及難以接受度,超強的核子戰略根本沒有驗證的可能性。在這種情況下,批評者遂認為,所謂「戰略」或「戰略研究」不過是執行者或制定者基於某些想像下的理論與假說,研究方法上的缺憾將使其實用價值大打折扣,甚至並不存在實用之可能性。 Methodological arraignment basically reflects on the following aspects. Firstly, critics argue that to prove a strategy appropriate or not, according to general methodological standards, verification of the results is required. However, war could unlikely be produced just for theoretical verification. Given the absence of sufficient evidences, it is impossible to prove or disapprove the utility of strategy proposed. This charge was particularly persuasive in the Cold War when superpowers’ strategy had been related to nuclear weapons and mutual destruction, by which gigantic damages were hardly acceptable. Without empirical means based on observation and experiment, strategy and strategic studies could merely derive theories and hypotheses from certain unattested predications. 其次,不可否認地,「戰略研究」者所研究之課題極具特殊性。除了「戰略」內涵之多元特性外,研究者本身不同的背景、文化、價值或是理念都會影響到「戰略研究」之結果。[16]也因此,一些批評者便認為「戰略研究」在本質上就難以去除種種的內在與外在偏見與價值影響,其「客觀性」是不存在的。按照此推論,如果所謂「客觀性」並不存在於「戰略研究」,則其根本就難以成為一經得起嚴格科學考驗之學科。所謂「戰略」也不過是在個人或團體影響下的種種價值混合體,本質上絕沒有什?租房子簻儩吤i言。[17] Secondly, many strategists may likely find themselves facing a highly difficult situation: they are expected to objectively analyse events with specialties, namely culture, value and belief system in a logical and systematic fashion, but they can hardly remain totally disinterested or devoid of personal whim, bias or prejudice. As such, some critics even conclude that objectivity, an indispensable part of scientific enquiry, would never be the very feature of strategy or strategic studies. The so-called strategy is merely the product of multiple perspectives under multifarious unstated assumptions of privileges of politicians, generals, or even researchers. 此外,一些評論也著眼於「戰略」的主要研究標的:「戰爭」上面。批評者認為,戰爭不論是從起源或過程來看,都是單獨存在的歷史事件,不同戰爭間彼此在特性上並沒有相似性,故其相應「戰略」也不過是獨立存在的推論。換言之,由於戰爭本身並沒有可比較性,也沒有原理或通則存在。隨著時空轉變,某一「戰略」實難以適合另一場戰爭。既然缺乏持續可運用性,「戰略」與「戰略研究」並沒有研究價值可言,即使有成果也註定其沒有實用性及參考性。[18] Third, some attacks lie in an inference that since wars are unique events, the causes of war should be supposedly as numerous as the number of wars and nothing in general can be found. In other words, given that strategic inference is obtained casually, and whether a research fits the criterion of knowledge enquiry is essentially influenced by time, place or/and other individual situation; whenever the causes shift, the results certainly would not remain the same. Deductively, there should be no universal principles or valuable functions of strategy. It would be unnecessary to do strategic studies as it would be doomed to be a failed effort. 最後,由於「戰略」與「政治」息息相關,因此政治學上有關決策的許多研究模式,包括個人(理性與非理性)、角色、組織(系統論)、政體以及國際體系都成為「戰略研究」的可能方法。換言之,決策者的心理與動機;官僚辯論與民意取向;個人、團體甚至國際聯盟或組織的價值等等都影響了「戰略」之制定與選擇。這些可能方法與潛在變因都是互動而並非排他的,也由於此種複雜變因之互為影響,使得「戰略」之分析與評估在研究方法更為困難。 Finally, thanks to close relations between strategic studies and politics, many models of political science, including personal (rationality and irrationality), role, organisational (systems), polity and international approaches has become potential research methods of strategic studies. In other words, the mentality or motives of decision-makers, bureaucratic debates and public opinions, the values of individuals, groups or even allies and international organisations would all possibly affect the formation and selection of strategic options. Such inclusive interactions seriously complicate the analysis and assessment of strategy. 分析與評論 Analysis and comments 平心而論,上述所提有關對於「戰略研究」之批評與挑戰都僅僅具有局部性(如果不是偏見的話),究其實質都不能對於「戰略」或是「戰略研究」構成全面性之否定。[19]以下作者就逐一對此批評及挑戰提出說明,並澄清外界對於「戰略研究」之誤解,期以提供世人一個對「戰略研究」較為正面的認知。 Each of those difficulties above mentioned has some validity for some strategists at some time, but they do not constitute powerful refutations to overall strategy and strategic studies. In the following pages, I would clarify some misunderstanding of strategy 辦公室出租 and try to encourage a more positive attitude toward strategic studies. 對於多元特性批評之反駁 To criticism of multidisciplinary nature 的確,「戰略」所涉及的範圍廣大旁雜,「戰略研究」的內涵也是自人文到自然科學無一不包,不過這種多元特性並不構成「戰略」或「戰略研究」的原罪,也不能成為否定其存在的理由。在多元內涵下,「戰略研究」或許也有彼此競爭之處,但卻絕不是一片混沌、毫無條理。相反地,「戰略研究」的多元性正是其範圍廣博及不斷擴展的來源,因而能夠使「戰略」本身及其相關議題之知識不斷產生及累積,蔚成一門巨學。從另一方面來看,由於隨著時代快速發展,戰略研究涉及先進科技在戰場上的應用與影響已不斷深化,事實上也早已超出個人研究的能力範圍,如飛彈防衛系統的評估就是最好的例子。在此種情況下,單一研究人員已不可能兼備所有領域之專業知識。正因為個人難以專精,機構性與組織性之跨領域整合便尤其重要。在歐美先進國家中,政府部門或非營利單位的智庫扮演了相當重要的整合角色。運用常設部門或特設小組的分工,以任務導向的作法,有效納用體制內或編制外之各科專才,即能收集思廣益、科技整合之效。此外,對於許多人來說,「戰略研究」的多元性也是令其著迷且願不斷努力耕耘之處,「戰略研究」學無止境的範圍更較其他學科更具廣博。吾人實在並沒有任何合理的理由因為「戰略研究」過於「多元」而強加限制其發展。 Strategic studies could perhaps encompass the most elements, from social to natural sciences as a scholarship. Such diversity constitutes competition, but this is not equal to chaos. On the contrary, diversity leads to expansion of strategy, and this is an essential process leading to the generation of cumulative and communicable knowledge. Meanwhile, due to the rapid development of science and technology, strategic studies has been becoming a subject that can hardly be mastered by any individual. Under such circumstances, organisational or group co-ordination would be essential to a comprehensive strategic study. From Western experiences, governmental research institutes and non-profit think tanks have played a vital role in interdisciplinary analysis of strategic issues. By means of standing departments or ad hoc groups, task-oriented approaches would help researchers effectively coordinate human resources and expertise. Finally, it cannot be denied that diversity makes strategy and strategic studies so inspired and fascinated. There is no need to confine the prosperous expansion of strategic studies as it can possibly be developed. 對於戰略機密性批評之反駁 To criticism of secrecy as a veil 誠然,在現代國家中,為了保護國家安全,機密制度的存在確有其必要性。然而此種機密劃分制度卻不應成為阻撓「戰略研究」發展或是成為妨礙其他政治人物、研究者或是一般大眾對於「戰略」正確了解的幫凶。吾人對於「機密」與「戰略研究」間之平衡所抱持有的態度應包括兩個層面:一方面來說,具有「戰略」決定權的人士不應因個人或黨政之私而僅對外公布片面甚或謬誤的戰略訊息,影響「戰略研究」的正常發展,而應該以更正面、積極的態度鼓勵人們對於「戰略」之適當認知與研究興趣。另一方面,從事「戰略研究」的個人及團體也需謹記其在接觸機密資料時應具有高度道德及法律上的責任遵守相關保密規定,絕不能因為任何外在或內在的誘因而將此類資料做不當之運用,這也是戰略研究者的基本良心所在。如果能夠把握這兩個原則,研究資料的機密敏感性亦當不致成為「戰略研究」的潛在困難才是。 It would be commonly agreed that to protect national interests and security needs classification systems, but such systems should never become obstacles preventing a better understanding on strategy for researchers, politicians and the general public. A proper attitude at least includ 租屋es two levels. On one hand, it would be absolutely damaging and unacceptable if some government officials, who on purpose cover realities just out of personal or party considerations, provide partial or even biased strategic information to other politicians, researchers or the public. On the other, those involving in strategic research and planning should also bear in mind that they are under obligations, morally and legally, to obey necessary confidentiality without being attracted to enticement of any kind by leaking out secret information. 對於戰爭之霧批評的反駁 To criticism of fog of war 作者對於「戰爭之霧」的看法在於以下幾個論點,首先,雖然已經過百餘年,克勞塞維茨所提出「戰爭之霧」顯然仍是戰爭過程中的內在因素之一。即使科技已突飛猛進,至今仍無法加以有效消除。以略為大膽的角度來看,也許「戰爭之霧」永遠沒有解除的一天,永遠都是戰略研究者所必須面對的不確定因素。其次,與其爭論現代科技是否能有效減少「戰爭之霧」,還不如探討此種因素是否能改變交戰雙方彼此「衝突」之平衡,而使戰事向有利於我方之方向發展。換言之,戰爭指導必須隨著軍事行動的變化發展而演變,一成不變的自限只會給予敵人相對優勢,在能力範圍內有效對「戰爭之霧」提出因應之道才是增加勝機之有效作法。第三,克勞塞維茨所提之「戰爭之霧」確有必要在現代高科技環境下給予其新義,在現代戰爭已儼然成為一項需要科際整合的龐然大物之時,如何在適當的時空環境中給予戰爭最為恰當之定義與描述,並以分工與專業分析戰爭走向,及早察覺「戰爭之霧」,才能有效發揮「戰略」的有效性。[20]總而言之,「戰爭之霧」也許仍不能盡去,「戰略」也許永遠都將存在此類不確定性。但以「戰略研究」來說,研究者實毋需將其忽略或粉飾,而是以一種較為正面的態度面對才是較為適宜的作法。 My disagreement on the dispersion of the fog of war will be strengthened by the following arguments. First, the prospects for eliminating friction completely appear quite dim because friction gives every evidence of being a built-in or structural feature of combat processes. In fact, if not too pessimistic, the fog of war may never be dissipated effectively. Such phenomenon may be forever the uncertain factor that strategists need to face. Second, whether friction’s overall magnitude for one side or the other can be appreciably reduced by technological advances is less important than whether such advances facilitate being able to shift the relative balance of friction between opponents more in one’s favour. In other words, the guidance of war must be dynamic and progressive. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy which can be applied in every circumstance. Self-limitation of such kind would only benefit the adversary. Strategists should simply provide decision-makers with more flexible options for counter the fog of war rather than stick to original plans as a bible. Third, recasting Clausewitz’s concept in contemporary terms is a useful step toward better understanding its likely role in future war regardless of what one may conclude about the possibility of either side largely eliminating its frictional impediments. As the modern war has been becoming a gigantic complex requiring interdisciplinary cooperation, professionalism and division of labour may offer a better solution to detect the fog of war and reduce it as early and as much as possible. 對於戰略研究圈紛爭批評的反駁 To internal disagreement within the strategic circles       文人與軍職戰略研 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 室內設計  .
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